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Abstract
Platforms use search diversion in order to trade o¤ total consumer tra¢ c for higher
revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products (e.g. advertising). We
show that competition between platforms leads to lower equilibrium levels of search di-
version relative to a monopoly platform when the intensity of competition is high. On
the other hand, if there is only mild competition, then competing platforms induce more
search diversion relative to a platform monopolist.
When platforms charge consumers xed access fees, all equilibrium levels of search
diversion under platform competition are equal to the monopoly level, irrespective of the
nature of competition. Furthermore, relative to platforms that cannot charge such fees,
platforms that charge positive (negative) access fees to consumers have weaker (stronger)
incentives to divert search.
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1 Introduction
Search diversion occurs when platforms providing access to various products deliberately intro-
duce noise in the search or browsing process through which consumers nd the products they
are most interested in. This practice is widespread among both o­ ine and online platforms. All
advertising-supported media (from magazines to online portals, news sites, and search engines)
are purposefully designed to expose users to advertisements, even though they are primarily
interested in content. Similarly, retailers often place the most sought-after items at the back or
upper oors of their stores (e.g. bread and milk at supermarkets, iPods and iPhones at Apple
stores), while shopping malls design their layout to maximize the distance travelled by visitors
between anchor stores (Petroski 2003). E-commerce sites (e.g. Amazon, Bing Shopping, eBay,
Google Shopping) design their websites in order to divert usersattention away from the prod-
ucts they were initially looking for, and towards the discovery of products that they might be
interested in and eventually buy (unsolicited products or advertising).
On the one hand, search diversion may lead to higher platform revenues per consumer "visit"
to the platform. On the other hand, it reduces the overall attractiveness of the platform to
consumers and therefore also leads to lower consumer tra¢ c (i.e. total number of visits). All
platforms listed above face this fundamental trade-o¤.
The basic economic logic of search diversion was rst analyzed by Hagiu and Jullien (2011),
using a model with a monopoly platform (intermediary) that o¤ers consumers access to two
products, whose a¢ liation with (i.e. availability through) the platform is exogenously given.
Here we extend that analysis by adding two important elements: (i) platform competition and
(ii) endogenous a¢ liation on both sides of the market - consumers and an unsolicited product
supplier (advertiser).
Our main result is that when consumers a¢ liate exclusively with one platform, competition
does not necessarily reduce search diversion incentives relative to monopoly. Specically, if
competition between platforms is intense (low degree of di¤erentiation) then competing plat-
forms induce less search diversion than a monopolist. But when competition is of moderate
intensity (intermediate degree of di¤erentiation), search diversion is greater than in the case of
a monopoly platform. Finally, if the degree of platform di¤erentiation is large then competing
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platforms behave like local monopolies and therefore choose the monopoly level of search diver-
sion. One interpretation of the scenario in which competing platforms divert search more than
a monopoly is that, since consumers are more di¢ cult to attract under competition, platforms
may prefer to increase revenue per consumer by diverting more search. This result holds whether
the advertiser a¢ liates exclusively or multihomes. Moreover, with exclusive advertising a¢ lia-
tion, each platform takes into account its competitors incentives to compete for the advertiser.
As a result, when competition is e¤ective on both sides, the equilibrium level of search diversion
maximizes total industry prot (both platforms and the advertiser). On the other hand, one
platform may prefer not to compete for the advertiser if it derives su¢ cient consumer demand
and revenue from the content solicited by consumers. In this case, the equilibrium level of
search diversion does not account for the "losing" platforms prots.
Second, allowing platforms to charge xed access fees results in less search diversion if and
only if the actual fee charged is positive. Furthermore, if platforms can charge consumers access
fees, competing platforms choose the same level of search diversion as a monopoly platform for
all parameter values and regardless of the mode of platform competition: all platforms maximize
the total surplus per consumer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two subsections we provide
a brief overview of our model and of the relevant literature. Section 2 lays out the modeling
set-up and analyzes the monopoly platform case, with endogenous consumer and advertising
a¢ liation. Section 3 introduces competition between platforms and analyzes three scenarios: a)
platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of consumers, whereas the advertiser multihomes;
b) platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of the advertiser, whereas consumers multi-
home; c) platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of both consumers and the advertiser.
In section 4 we introduce the possibility for platforms to charge consumers access fees. Section
5 concludes.
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1.1 Model overview and interpretation
In our model, each platform o¤ers consumers access to two products, 1 and 2. Product 1
(content) o¤ers consumers expected utility u1 > 0 and is assumed to be exogenously a¢ liated
with each platform throughout the paper. Product 2 corresponds to unsolicited content, which
for convenience we refer to as advertising. It o¤ers consumers expected utility u2 = 0 and is
supplied by a third-party seller (advertiser), who must be induced to a¢ liate by platforms
choices of fees and search diversion. Platforms may derive positive revenues from consumer
exposure to both products. Each product exposure is costly to consumers: it requires time and
attention. The platformsrevenues per consumer exposure to product 1 (1) could be referral
fees paid by an independent seller or the margin made on the sale of product 1 multiplied by
the conversion rate (probability that a consumer who sees the product ends up buying it) if the
platform supplies product 1 itself; or any type of fees directly tied to usage of product 1 (e.g.
pay-per-view). Meanwhile, the platformsrevenues per consumer exposure to product 2 (2)
can be interpreted as "per-impression" or "per-click" fees paid by its seller.
The key decision made by the platform is the amount of search diversion to induce through
its service, which we identify with the probability that it exposes consumers to product 2 before
directing them to product 1. Indeed, although consumers always prefer being immediately
exposed to product 1, the platform may nd that rst diverting them to product 2 maximizes
total revenues. We use the term "search" because in a sense consumers are searching for product
1 and the platform chooses how e¢ cient to make this search process. More search diversion
leads to higher total exposure costs incurred by consumers.
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Table 1
Our modelling set-up is best interpreted as a stylized representation of advertising-supported
media, such as the ones listed in Table 1.1 All platforms listed in Table 1 provide users with
rst-party content (cf. Hagiu and Spulber 2012), such as organic search results, information,
editorial stories or products sold in their own name. All of them make positive revenues from
user exposure to advertising or products users were not necessarily looking for (2 > 0). Some of
them (search engines, content portals) make no revenues from rst-party content, while others
(shopping portals, e-commerce and paid video sites) derive positive revenues from exposing
consumers to rst-party content. For shopping portals, 1 is equal to the click-through rate
of listed products multiplied by the referral fees charged to the third-party merchants who sell
those products. For online video sites and e-commerce, 1 is the conversion rate multiplied by
the video-on-demand prices (Hulu, Vimeo) or the booking fees charged to users (Fandango) or
the margins made on shoes sold (Zappos).
The extent of search diversion varies across these platforms from minimal (small and unin-
1CPM is the advertising industry term for cost per impression (literally, "cost per mille", i.e. a thousand
impressions), while CPC stands for "cost per click".
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trusive ads on Fandango.com, sponsored search results at the bottom of Google Shopping pages)
to moderate (sponsored search results at the top and right-hand side of Googles search engine
pages) to very high (in addition to showing several large ads on every content page, Forbes.com
requires users to view a video ad prior to watching every piece of video content and oftentimes
to click through a full-page display ad before reaching the desired content page).
1.2 Related literature
Our paper builds upon the model of search diversion introduced by Hagiu and Jullien (2011).
That paper established that search diversion allows platforms to: (i) trade o¤ higher total
consumer tra¢ c for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) inuence independent product
sellerschoices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). It also showed that search diversion is a
strategic instrument that cannot be easily replaced by contractual extensions and that it can
be socially desirable because consumers do not internalize the benets of their search activities
for product sellers. We extend Hagiu and Jullien (2011)s analysis in two important and novel
directions: competition among platforms and endogenous product and consumer a¢ liation
(Hagiu and Jullien 2011 focus exclusively on a monopoly platform with exogenously given
product and consumer a¢ liation).
We contribute to the economics and strategy literature on two-sided platforms by introduc-
ing a key design decision that many platforms have to make, but has not been formally studied:
search diversion. Indeed, most of the existing work on two-sided platforms focuses on pricing
strategies (Armstrong 2006, Parker and Van Alstyne 2005, Rochet and Tirole 2006, Weyl 2010)
and market outcomes (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Hossain et al. 2011) in the presence of indi-
rect network e¤ects. Our paper is aligned with an emerging body of work aiming to expand
the formal study of platforms to design decisions (e.g. Parker and Van Alstyne 2008, Boudreau
2010, Hagiu and Spulber 2012, Veiga and Weyl 2012).
At a broader level, several articles have pointed out that platforms have to make design
compromises between the interests of their two sides (e.g. Kaplan and Sawhney 2000, Evans
and Schmalensee 2007), but this issue has received limited formal modelling treatment. An
exception is the recent literature on search engines. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) show that vertical
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search engines do not necessarily maximize consumer search quality, a point similar to Hagiu
and Jullien (2011), though in a di¤erent context. Relatedly, Yang and Ghose (2010), Taylor
(2013) and White (2013) emphasize that raising the quality of search results may cannibalize
revenue from sponsored links, while Burguet et al. (2013) study the joint choice of match quality
for the organic and sponsored links displayed. Our model here is di¤erent in that we focus on
advertising that negatively impacts the perceived quality of the search service by consumers.
Finally, our paper is also connected to the literature on advertising-supported platforms:
Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al. (2006), Peitz and Valletti (2008), Crampes et al.
(2009), Ellman and Germano (2009), Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2010). In particular, Ellman
and Germano (2009) consider a newspaper model where the quality of news reporting matters
for readers but also for (non-intrusive) advertising e¤ectiveness. They nd that newspaper
competition has an ambiguous e¤ect on news quality. These papers study product positioning
and product quality choices by ad-sponsored platforms. In contrast, our focus is on the design
of platformsproduct exposure mechanism.
A very recent strand of this literature studies the e¤ect of consumers and advertisers
"multihoming" behavior (i.e. their presence on multiple online outlets) on rm prots. Athey
Calvano and Gans (2012) show that the value of advertising in one outlet depends on consumer
multihoming and focus on tracking technologies, while Athey and Gans (2010) study targeted
advertising. In our competition sections, we analyze the impact of consumer and advertiser
multihoming on the endogenous rate of exposure to advertising (search diversion in our model).
Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2012) discuss the nature of price competition when all agents
can multihome. We share with them the conclusion that competition does not restore e¢ ciency,
but their paper focuses on the volume of advertising, whereas we focus on the design of the ex-
posure service. Broadly, targeting, tracking and diversion can all be viewed as various instances
of platform service design, thus our work is complementary to this stream of literature.
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2 Monopoly platform set-up
In this section we lay out the foundation for our analysis using a variant of the model in
Hagiu and Jullien (2011). We present the model here but postpone its discussion until after
proposition 1, where it will be more transparent. There is a monopoly platform which allows
a unit mass of consumers to access two products, 1 and 2. Product 1 is already available
through (or a¢ liated with) the platform, while product 2 must be attracted by the platform
(its a¢ liation is endogenous). To access either product, a consumer must rst a¢ liate with
(i.e. visit) the platform and then be exposed to the product through a search process described
below. Consumers are interested in product 1 only, which can be interpreted as content, e.g.
editorial stories, videos, organic search results. They are not interested in product 2, which can
be interpreted as advertising.
2.1 Consumers
All consumers derive net expected utility u1 = u from being exposed to product 1 and u2 = 0
from being exposed to product 2, where 0 < u < 1 is exogenously given. These utilities should
be interpreted as encompassing the utility of just viewing the product plus the expected utility
of actually consuming it, net of the price paid (we do not model product pricing decisions).
Ex-ante, i.e. before a¢ liating with the platform, consumers only di¤er in their location x,
uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The monopoly platform is located at 0. When consumer x
a¢ liates with the platform, she incurs transportation costs tx, where t > 0.
Ex-post, i.e. after deciding whether or not to a¢ liate with the platform, consumers learn
their unitary cost of exposure (or cost of search) c, which they incur whenever they are exposed
to a product. When both products are a¢ liated with the platform, consumers can only view
them sequentially and therefore are subject to one or two product exposures. The search cost
c can be interpreted as the cost of consumer attention; it is distributed on [0; 1] according
to a twice continuously di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function F . From an ex-ante
perspective, a consumer located at any position x perceives the same ex-post distribution of
search costs F (:).
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Thus, consumers make two decisions: whether or not to visit the platform, and whether or
not to engage in product search if they decided to visit the platform.
2.2 The platform
For conciseness, we assume that the monopoly platform is vertically integrated into product 1.
The platform derives expected prots 1  0 for each consumer exposure to product 1, where
1 is known by all players and exogenously xed.
Product 2 is supplied by an independent seller (advertiser), who must be induced to a¢ liate.
The advertiser derives prot 2 for every consumer exposure to its product, which is also publicly
known (we study the case in which 2 is unobservable in section ??). In order to a¢ liate with
the platform and gain access to its consumers, the advertiser must pay the platform a per-
impression (per-click) fee r. We assume the platform has all the bargaining power when setting
r.
Throughout the paper, only the ratio 2=1 a¤ects the level of search diversion. For this
reason, we normalize our model by setting
1 = 1 and 2 = .
Note that a platform with no revenue from rst-party content (1 = 0) corresponds to  = +1,
which can be accommodated by the analysis.
For now, we assume the platform does not charge any access fees to consumers. We study
the e¤ect of allowing access fees in section 4.
2.3 Search diversion
The platform has a design technology that allows it to choose a probability s 2 [0; 1] with which
it rst exposes any given consumer to product 2 before showing her product 1. The probability
s represents the level of search diversion induced by the platform. Once a consumer has been
exposed to product 2, she knows that she will next be exposed for sure to product 1, but she
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will then need to incur her search cost c again. The focus of our paper is on platformschoice
of s. We assume that s can be costlessly set to any value between 0 and 1.
One can think of (1  s) as a measure of how e¢ cient the design of the platform is for
consumers. Does the platform provide quick and clear access to the products or content that
consumers are searching for (low s)? Or does it try to expose consumers to various forms of
unsolicited content before providing the service they came for in the rst place (high s)?
2.4 Timing
The timing of the game we consider in this section is as follows:
1. The platform commits to s publicly and credibly
2. The platform sets the fee r to be paid by the advertiser
3. The advertiser decides whether or not to a¢ liate with the platform
4. Consumers observe s and the advertisers a¢ liation decision and decide whether or not
to a¢ liate with the platform
5. A¢ liated consumers learn their individual cost c, then engage in product search.
Three aspects of this set-up deserve mention. First, separating the choices of s and r has
no e¤ect on the solution of the monopoly game.
Second, the design parameter s is observed by consumers before deciding whether or not
to visit the platform (for instance, through reviews or word of mouth) and by the advertiser
before deciding to a¢ liate or not, and we assume it is not subject to ex-post opportunism, i.e.
cannot be adjusted once a¢ liation decisions have been made. In fact, it is in the platforms
best interest to credibly announce s upfront because s a¤ects not only consumer utility, but
also expected payo¤s for the advertiser that the platform is courting.2
2If ex-post opportunism was possible, then the unique equilibrium with consistent expectations would be
s = 1. Indeed, once consumers and the advertisers are a¢ liated, the platform can unambiguously increase
revenues by increasing s. Thus, it is in the platforms interest to credibly commit to (or develop a reputation
for) a level of search diversion s < 1 ex-ante (s = 1 is almost never optimal).
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Third, a¢ liation decisions by consumers typically involve longer time horizons than activity
(search) decisions. Moreover, a¢ liation is usually based on less information than activity,
as consumers learn about the platform gradually. This is captured by our assumption that
a¢ liation is based on the level of search diversion and expectation of search costs, while activity
(search) is based on the realized individual search cost. This assumption simplies the analysis
without loss of substance: the key feature that we need is that total consumer demand is
decreasing in s (as is realistic).
2.5 The consumer search process and a¢ liation decision
In stage 5, consumers a¢ liated with the platform must decide whether to search or not. When
the platform has chosen s > 0 and product 2 is a¢ liated, consumers know that they may be
diverted. A consumer with search cost c  u who is rst diverted to product 2 will still proceed
to product 1, because she knows with certainty that she will obtain net utility u  c  0. If the
consumer is not diverted, i.e. if she is directly exposed to product 1, then she stops searching
immediately and will not be exposed to product 2 (which would yield negative net utility  c).
To x ideas, it is useful to think of an advertising-supported news website. If a user is rst
shown an ad, she will still click or scroll to nd the news content. If she is shown the content
right away, she will never go on searching for ads.
The consumers net expected utility from searching is thus u  (1 + s) c and is positive for
c  u= (1 + s). Consumers with search cost above u= (1 + s) do not engage in search at all.
Using the news website example, the expected utility provided by the site to such consumers
is not su¢ cient to justify the time wasted clicking through or scrolling over ads.
Working backwards to stage 4, a consumer located at x a¢ liates with the platform if and
only if V (s)  tx  0, where:
V (s) 
Z u=(1+s)
0
(u  (1 + s) c) f (c) dc (1)
is the expected consumer utility from the perspective of stage 4, gross of access price and
transportation costs. Note that V (s) is decreasing.
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If only one product is a¢ liated with the platform then consumers who visit the platform
nd the a¢ liated product with probability 1 in just one round of search. If only product 1
is a¢ liated then expected consumer utility from the perspective of stage 4 is V (0). If only
product 2 is a¢ liated then expected consumer utility is 0.
2.6 Optimal search diversion
Since the advertisers per impression prot  is common knowledge, the platform sets r = 
(slightly below) in stage 2, which ensures the advertiser a¢ liates and extracts its entire prot.3
The incentives to divert search are thus the same as if the platform were also vertically integrated
with the product 2 seller, i.e. if it owned both products.
Total consumer demand for (or tra¢ c to) the platform is then min (V (s) =t; 1), weakly
decreasing in the level of search diversion s. The platforms prots as a function of s are
X (s; )min (V (s) =t; 1) , (2)
where we have denoted4
X (s; )  (1 + s)F

u
1 + s

the revenues derived by the platform from the product exposures of each a¢ liated consumer.
The optimization of (2) over s involves a trade-o¤ between total consumer tra¢ c and par-
ticipation in the search process on the one hand, and the average number of product exposures
per consumer on the other hand. Indeed, an increase in s induces a consumer to see two prod-
ucts with probability s, which yields revenues 1 + s to the platform, but it also reduces the
proportion of consumers who engage in search, F (u= (1 + s)), as well as total consumer tra¢ c
to the platform, V (s) =t. Variations of this trade-o¤are analyzed at length in Hagiu and Jullien
(2011). The key novelty here is the term V (s) =t: indeed, Hagiu and Jullien (2011) treat total
consumer a¢ liation with the platform as exogenously given, equal to 1.
3Note that the platform always (weakly) prefers to attract the advertiser. Indeed, the platform can always
replicate the scenario with no advertiser a¢ lation by choosing s = 0.
4The argument  is included for consistency with the competition section, where the price per exposure
charged to the advertiser can be lower than .
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We also denote:
sXV ()  argmax
s
fX (s; )V (s)g (3)
sX ()  argmax
s
fX (s; )g ,
so that sX () > sXV () because V (:) is decreasing. With this notation, we obtain:
Proposition 1 The optimal level of search diversion for a monopoly platform is:
sM (; t) = argmax
s
fX (s; )min (V (s) =t; 1)g (4)
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
sX () if t  V (sX ())
V  1 (t) if t 2 [V (sX ()) ; V (sXV ())]
sXV () if t  V (sXV ())
It is (weakly) increasing in  and (weakly) decreasing in t.
The second part of the proposition (proven in the appendix) states that the platform di-
verts search more when it derives higher revenues from the product that consumers are not
interested in (advertising) relative to the product that they are interested in (content). The
reason is straightforward: when the platform derives more revenues from content (advertis-
ing), its interests are more (less) aligned with those of consumers, therefore the optimal level
of search diversion is lower (higher). Recall indeed that consumers always prefer less search
diversion. The comparative static in t is easily understood: the platform diverts search more
when consumer tra¢ c is less elastic in (i.e. less responsive to) search diversion.
This result is consistent with the examples discussed in the introduction. Restricting atten-
tion to platforms that do not charge access fees, those platforms that derive no revenues from
content, i.e. with  = +1 (e.g. search engines, Forbes.com), clearly engage in more search
diversion relative to platforms with content revenue, i.e. with  nite (e.g. Google Shopping,
Fandango). Note in particular the contrast between Google search, on which sponsored search
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results are at the top and on the right hand side of the page, and Google Shopping, where
sponsored search results only appear at the bottom of the page (much less intrusive).
Thus, although highly stylized, our model contains the two ingredients necessary to capture
the key trade-o¤s associated with search diversion. First, platformsprot incentives are im-
perfectly aligned with consumer preferences: platforms derive positive revenues from exposing
consumers to products that they do not care about ( > 0 and possibly  > 1). Second,
exposure to individual products is costly for consumers and the platform can make design deci-
sions (captured by s) that inuence the degree to which consumers are exposed to one product
relative to the other.
Of course, in most real-world settings there are more than two products, multiple sellers
or advertisers per product and perhaps even complementarity or substitutability across prod-
ucts. Introducing any of these aspects would unnecessarily complicate our analysis, since the
fundamental mechanics of search diversion remain unchanged. For the same reason, we treat
 as exogenously given in our model, i.e. we do not endogenize price-setting by independent
sellers. Some of these extensions are treated by Hagiu and Jullien (2011) in the context of a
monopoly platform choosing search diversion. Finally, while the assumption u2 = 0 best ts
contexts in which product 2 is advertising (as in the examples listed in Table 1 above), the
general implications we derive hold for any platforms that have incentives to divert consumers
away from the products that best suit their preferences and towards products they are less -
but still positively - interested in (u2 > 0). For instance, Netix uses its recommender system
in an attempt to steer users towards less popular movies, which entail lower licensing costs
and are less likely to run out of stock, which in turn means they generate higher margins for
Netix (Shih et al. 2007). A similar practice is used by Amazon.com. Indeed, the di¤erence
between diverting consumers to advertising and diverting them to products that they nd less
desirable is simply one of degree. Consumers may derive 0 expected utility from being exposed
to advertisements, whereas they might perceive a (small) positive expected utility from being
exposed to products other than the ones that they initially came to the platform for. The only
thing that matters is that the platform derives positive margins from such unsolicited products.
In a previous draft version, we worked with u2 > 0: the analysis turned out to be more complex
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than the one presented here but the main results were the same. This is why we have opted to
work with u2 = 0.
3 Competition
In this section we analyse how competition a¤ects search diversion incentives. We maintain the
same structure of consumer preferences, except that there are now two competing platforms, A
and B, one at each end of the Hotelling [0; 1] segment. Each platform is vertically integrated
into product 1. Although we use the same label, product 1 on platform A may di¤er from the
product 1 on platform B. We consider three competition scenarios:
i) Competition for consumers: the advertiser can multihome and the platforms compete
solely for the exclusive a¢ liation of consumers
ii) Competition for advertising: consumers can multihome (at no charge) and the platforms
compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of a unique advertiser
iii) Two-sided competition: the platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of both con-
sumers and the independent advertiser.
Case (i) is most relevant for traditional advertising-supported media platforms such as tele-
vision or newspapers, where consumers typically watch one channel or subscribe to one newspa-
per, whereas large advertisers typically place ads in multiple outlets. This is the "classic" case
of competition among media platforms studied by Anderson and Coate (2005) and also used by
Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2010). Case (i) also remains relevant for some Internet platforms
(e.g. e-commerce, search engines), where consumers tend to singlehome due to switching costs
(habit formation, limited attention). By contrast, consumers may perceive low switching costs
for other Internet platforms (e.g. online news), so that they routinely visit multiple sites. In
such contexts, advertisers may prefer to singlehome due to budget constraints and to the fact
they may be able to reach the same consumers on either platform. Case (iii) may seem like a
more rare occurrence in reality, but it provides an interesting comparison point to cases (i) and
(ii). Furthermore, the underlying mechanisms are quite di¤erent.
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Note that we omit the fourth logical scenario, in which both sides multihome: in that case
there would be no competition for participation on either side, which is our focus.5
In all three competition scenarios, the timing is the same as in the monopoly case. Platforms
A and B commit simultaneously to sA and sB respectively in stage 1 (publicly and credibly),
then simultaneously set fees rA and rB to be paid by the advertiser in stage 2. The other
stages are similar, with agents (advertiser and consumers) choosing to a¢ liate exclusively or
not, depending on the competition scenario. When a consumer is a¢ liated with both platforms,
her stage 5 utility from engaging in product search on one platform is independent of what she
does on the other platform.
We have separated the choices of si and ri between the rst two stages of the game in order
to better reect reality: fees charged to sellers are typically set after committing to platform
design. Our equilibrium characterization below would be the same if we worked with the entire
space of (si; ri) deviations. The di¤erence is that the set of equilibrium conditions to satisfy
would be signicantly more complicated; this is another reason for adopting our simpler set-up.
3.1 Competition for consumers
In this scenario, the advertiser multihomes whereas consumers singlehome. In stage 2, each
platform sets ri =  and the advertiser a¢ liates with both platforms.6
If t is not too large so that the two platforms actually compete against each other, then
platform is prots from the perspective of stage 1 are:
i = X (si; )

1
2
+
V (si)  V (sj)
2t

(5)
In this case, the equilibrium level of search diversion solves:
sXV 2 (; t) = argmax
s

X (s; )

1
2
+
V (s)  V (sXV 2 (; t))
2t

(6)
5Despite the absence of competition when both sides multihome, the multiplicity of o¤ers reduces the prot
of each platform because there may be competition in terms of service usage (as opposed to participation). See
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Athey, Calvano and Gans (2012), Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2012) or Taylor
(2012).
6This scenario is equivalent to assuming that each platform is vertically integrated into products 1 and 2.
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In contrast, if t is large, then each platform acts as a local monopolist and chooses the
monopoly level of search diversion. Relegating the remaining details to the appendix, we
obtain:
Lemma 1 There exists t1 > V (sXV ()) such that the symmetric equilibrium level of search
diversion when platforms compete for consumers only is:
sc (; t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
sXV 2 (; t) if 0  t  t1
V  1
 
t
2

if t1  t  2V (sXV ())
sXV () if t  2V (sXV ())
It is increasing in t for t 2 0; t1, decreasing in t for t 2 t1; 2V (sXV ()), and everywhere
(weakly) increasing in .
On the interval t 2 0; t1, i.e. when platforms compete, t has the opposite e¤ect on sc
relative to sM . To explain this, recall that the level of search diversion results from a trade-o¤
between revenue per user (1 + sr) and total participation by consumers. The latter becomes
less elastic when competition for consumers is less intense (larger t), which shifts the trade-o¤
towards extracting more revenues per user, i.e. towards more diversion. On the other hand, if
t is above the t1 threshold, then platforms no longer compete against each other, therefore sc
is decreasing in t, just like sM . The comparative statics in  is the same as for the monopoly
platform and the same interpretation applies.
We can now compare sc with s
M :
Proposition 2 Relative to the level of search diversion chosen by a monopoly platform, the
equilibrium level of search diversion when platforms compete for consumers only is strictly
lower for low t, strictly higher for intermediate t, and equal for large t. Specically:
 sc (; t) < sM (; t) for 0  t < V (sXV ())
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 sc (; t) > sM (; t) for V (sXV ()) < t < 2V (sXV ())
 sc (; t) = sM (; t) for t  2V (sXV ())
To illustrate, Figure 1 represents sc and s
M as functions of t.
Figure 1
Restricting attention to the region of interest t 2 0; t1 (on which platforms actually com-
pete), our model predicts that the equilibrium level of search diversion with competing platforms
is lower than the one chosen by a monopolist when competition is intense (low t) and higher
when competition is not too intense (high t). When t is small, the total consumer partici-
pation for the monopolist does not depend on search diversion - it is xed at 1. Therefore,
the monopolist only accounts for the e¤ect of search diversion on revenues per participating
consumer, X (s; ). In contrast, when t is small, competing platforms must take into account
the e¤ect of their respective levels of search diversion not just on revenues per participating
consumer, but also on overall consumer participation. Since total consumer demand for a given
platform is decreasing in the level of search diversion, it is natural that competing platforms
end up choosing a lower equilibrium level of search diversion. Consider now that case when t
is large enough so that the monopolist no longer nds it optimal to attract all consumers. In
this case, the marginal e¤ect of search diversion perceived by the monopolist incorporates both
the e¤ect on revenues per participating consumer (Xs (s; )) and the e¤ect on total consumer
participation (V 0 (s) =t). If t is not too large so that competing platforms are still constrained
by competition for consumers, then they also take into account both e¤ects. The only di¤erence
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is that each competing platform perceives a marginal (negative) e¤ect of search diversion on
total consumer demand equal to V 0 (s) =2t, which is half of the e¤ect perceived by the monop-
olist. This simply reects the fact that competitive pressure reduces platformsability to gain
additional consumer participation. As a result, in this case the monopolist ends up choosing a
lower level of search diversion than the competing platforms.
One can also interpret this result (competing platforms diverting search more than a mo-
nopolist) by relying on the elasticity of consumer participation with respect to search diversion.
This elasticity is  sV 0 (s) =V (s) in the case of a monopoly that does not cover the entire con-
sumer market (i.e. t > V (s)), whereas it is equal to  sV 0 (s) =t for a duopoly with equal
market shares. Thus, if t > V (s) then the former elasticity is larger, which leads to less search
diversion under monopoly. On the other hand, the opposite holds if the monopolist covers the
entire consumer market (t < V (sXV ())): the monopolists choice of search diversion ignores
the impact on consumer a¢ liation decisions, which competing platforms can never ignore.
3.2 Competition for unsolicited content
Consider now the opposite scenario relative to the previous subsection: consumers can costlessly
multihome and the platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of an advertiser. Specically,
we assume that the platforms o¤er non-substitutable versions of product 1 (content), so that
a consumer who a¢ liates with both intermediaries derives utility 2u from consuming the two
versions of product 1 (gross of search and transportation costs). We assume the advertiser
a¢ liates exclusively with one platform.7
If the advertiser a¢ liates with platformA, then platformA prots areX (sA; rA)min (V (sA) =t; 1),
whereas platform B prots are F (u)min (V (0) =t; 1). The advertisers payo¤ is
(   rA) sAF

u
1 + sA

min

V (sA)
t
; 1

= (X (sA; ) X (sA; rA))min

V (sA)
t
; 1

.
Relegating the remaining details to the appendix, we obtain:
7Exclusive a¢ liation by the advertiser could be obtained endogenously by assuming that, for each consumer,
only the rst product exposure matters and that there is a su¢ ciently large probability that the same consumers
are exposed to advertising on both platforms (see Athey Calvano and Gans 2012).
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Proposition 3 When consumers multihome and platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation
of an advertiser, the equilibrium level of search diversion is the same as that chosen by a
monopoly platform: sa (; t) = s
M (; t).
Thus, competition for product 2 (advertising) does not a¤ect search diversion relative to a
monopolist. This result is driven by Bertrand competition for the advertiser. Each platform
i sets its search diversion level si to maximize its joint prots with the advertiser when the
latter a¢ liates with i exclusively, i.e. X (si; )min (V (si) =t; 1). Then both platforms compete
in fees ri so that the advertiser ends up capturing all of the joint prots in excess of each
platforms outside option, F (u)min (V (0) =t; 1), which does not depend on search diversion
levels. Consequently, although competition shifts the split of the joint vertical prot in favor
of the advertiser, it is still optimal for platforms to choose the design that maximizes this joint
prot. The di¤erence is that a monopoly platform maximizes the value that can be extracted
from the advertiser, whereas competing platforms seek to maximize the chance to attract the
advertiser.
3.3 Competition for both consumers and advertising
Let us now turn to the case in which the two platforms compete for exclusive a¢ liation on both
sides of the market. The full analysis of this competition scenario turns out to be signicantly
more complex than for the previous two cases and is therefore provided in the Online Appendix.
Here, we highlight the main feature of the resulting equilibrium.
The key di¤erence with the two previous competition scenarios is that here it is no longer
clear whether both platforms wish to compete for the advertiser. To see why, suppose platform
A "wins" the exclusive a¢ liation of the advertiser in Stage 2. Then the "losing" platform B
obtains higher consumer demand, which may compensate for its lower revenues per consumer
(no advertising). Thus, given the levels of search diversion set in stage 1, it is possible that
B obtains a larger prot without the advertiser than the maximum prot it could expect to
achieve if it were to attract the advertiser. When this is the case, platform B prefers not to make
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an o¤er to the advertiser in stage 2 and platform A is a de facto monopoly on the advertiser side
of the market. As a result, the level of search diversion chosen by platform A simply maximizes
its joint prots with the advertiser, conditional on platform B not having any advertising at
all.
The alternative scenario is when platform B does indeed wish to compete for the advertiser
in Stage 2 of the game. Then the equilibrium level of search diversion chosen by platform
A maximizes total industry prots, i.e. including the advertiser and both platforms. The
reason that platform Bs prot is taken into account is as follows: A must o¤er the advertiser
a payo¤ just above the largest payo¤ that can be o¤ered by B, which is the di¤erence between
its joint prot with the advertiser and what B gets when the advertiser a¢ liates with A.
Raising the latter (i.e. Bs outside option) reduces Bs benets from winning the contest for the
advertiser and thereby decreases the value A needs to forego in order to attract the advertiser.
In particular, if the advertiser a¢ liates with A, increasing search diversion by platform A raises
platform Bs prot because it leads more consumers go to B instead of A. In other words, when
it expects platform B to compete for the advertiser, the winning platform A maximizes total
industry prot because it internalizes the fact that yielding more consumer demand to platform
B (through more search diversion) reduces the cost of attracting the advertiser, by reducing
platform Bs willingness to compete.
In both scenarios, the comparative statics of the equilibrium level of search diversion in
(t; ) are the same as in the case of competition for consumers and interpreted in the same way.
Relegating the full analysis to the Online Appendix, we directly provide the main result:
Proposition 4 Relative to the level of search diversion chosen by a monopoly platform sM (; t),
the maximum level of search diversion that can be sustained in equilibrium when platforms com-
pete for both consumers and the advertiser, s (; t), is strictly lower for low t and strictly higher
for large t. Specically, there exist t2 2 [0; V (0)] and t3 > V (0) such that:
 s (; t)  sM (; t) for 0  t  t2
 s (; t) > sM (; t) for t2 < t  t3
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This result conrms the one obtained under competition for consumers only (despite a
signicantly more complex analysis): once again, the equilibrium level of search diversion with
competing platforms is lower than the one chosen by a monopolist when competition is intense
(low t) and higher when competition is not too intense (high t). The explanation is the same.
4 Access fees
In this section we introduce the possibility that platforms can charge access fees to consumers,
denoted by P and paid before search costs c are observed. A priori, P can be positive or negative.
A negative access fee can be interpreted as a monetary subsidy (e.g. cash or redeemable points)
or rst-party content (beyond product 1) that consumers value at more than the price being
charged.
The timing we use throughout this section (monopoly as well as competing platforms) is:
1. Platforms choose sA and sB simultaneously
2. Platforms choose rA and rB simultaneously
3. The advertiser decides which platform(s) to a¢ liate with
4. Platforms choose consumer access fees PA and PB simultaneously
5. Consumers decide which platform(s) to a¢ liate with
6. A¢ liated consumers learn c and engage in product search.
Our timing ensures that decisions regarding consumer access fees do not interfere with
decisions a¤ecting the quality of the services o¤ered to consumers (search diversion). The value
expected by consumers from each platform results from the combination of search diversion and
the advertisers a¢ liation decisions, and it is known at the time price competition for consumers
occurs.8 As in the previous sections, we have separated the choices of si and ri between the rst
two stages of the game.
8This allows us to avoid coordination issues in a¢ liation decisions (see Caillaud and Jullien 2003), which are
not the focus of this paper.
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4.1 Monopoly
The monopoly platforms prots are now:
max
P;s

(P +X (s; ))min

V (s)  P
t
; 1

. (7)
It is straightforward to obtain (details are in the appendix):
Proposition 5 The optimal level of search diversion for a monopoly platform that can charge
access fees is:
bsM () = sX+V ()  argmax
s
fX (s; ) + V (s)g (8)
Allowing the monopoly platform to charge access fees results in less search diversion (bsM  sM)
if and only if the prot-maximizing access fee is non-negative ( bPM  0)
The rst part of the proposition says that when the platform can monetize consumer par-
ticipation, it chooses search diversion to maximize the joint surplus (platform + consumers)
from participation. Also, note that just like sM (), the level of search diversion with access
fees bsM () is weakly increasing in .
The second part of the proposition says that the ability to monetize consumer participation
reduces search diversion incentives. This result is intuitive: if the platform wishes to charge
consumers a positive access fee, it must increase their willingness-to-pay, which means it needs
to reduce search diversion. Conversely, a platform wishes to subsidize consumers when this sac-
rice allows it to mitigate the e¤ect of increasing search diversion on consumersparticipation.
This result is consistent with some of the examples discussed in the introduction. Compare
the websites of Forbes and The New York Times. Both rely on advertising, but The New
York Times charges users a subscription fee, whereas access to Forbes is entirely free for users.
Advertising on the New York Times web page is moderate; in contrast, advertising is highly
intrusive on Forbes.com. A similar comparison applies to YouTube and Hulu. YouTube de-
rives no revenues from rst-party content or subscription fees and its advertisements are quite
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intrusive (sometimes 15 seconds with no opt-out before being able to watch a 2-minute video).
Hulu relies on membership fees (Hulu Plus) and video-on-demand revenues - as a result, its
advertisements are quite limited.
4.2 Competition
Consider the rst competition scenario, in which the advertiser multihomes and consumers
singlehome. In stage 2 the platforms set rA = rB = , thus fully extracting the advertisers
surplus. As a result, stage 4 prots for platform i are:
i = (Pi +X (si; ))

1
2
+
V (si)  Pi   V (sj) + Pj
2t

Given (si; sj) chosen in stage 1, the stage 2 pricing equilibrium is easily veried to be Pi =
t+ (V (si)  V (sj) X (sj; )  2X (si; )) =3, leading to stage 1 platform prots:
i (si; sj) =
t
2

1 +
V (si) +X (si; )  V (sj) X (sj; )
3t
2
(9)
Going backwards to stage 1, the symmetric equilibrium level of search diversion is:
bsc () = argmax
s
fX (s; ) + V (s)g = bsM () . (10)
In other words, we obtain the same level of search diversion as the one chosen by a monopoly
platform. The following proposition (proven in the appendix) conrms that this is also true
under the other two competition scenarios (their analysis is more complicated):
Proposition 6 When platforms can charge access fees, the equilibrium levels of search diver-
sion under all three competition scenarios are the same as one another and equal to the level
chosen by a platform monopolist:
bsc () = bsa () = bs () = sX+V () = bsM ()
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Furthermore, in the two competition scenarios in which one side multihomes, the equilibrium
level of search diversion with access fees is lower relative to the case with no access fees if and
only if the equilibrium access fee is positive.
Thus, when access fees are feasible, the equilibrium level of search diversion is identical to
the one chosen by a monopoly platform. In this case, platforms maximize the joint surplus of
the relationship with consumers and use the access fee to share this surplus with consumers.
Competition only a¤ects the level of the access fee.
In all three competition cases, the central part of the proof is showing that in the equilib-
rium of the game starting at stage 2 the advertiser a¢ liates with the platform i that creates
the highest joint surplus X (si; )+V (si). This was straightforward for the scenario with com-
petition for consumers only, but turns out to be more complicated for the other two scenarios
(cf. appendix).
The fundamental reason we obtain the equilibrium level of search diversion that maximizes
X (s; ) + V (s) for all monopoly and competition cases is that the access fee allows platforms
to transfer surplus so all that matters beyond stage 1 of the game is the total surplus per
consumer. The result for the scenario when the advertiser multihomes echoes similar results in
Choi (2006) and Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009). In all of these models, platforms
maximize the joint platform-consumer surplus; this corresponds to total surplus per consumer in
our model, because each platform extracts the entire prot from the vertical structure (platform
plus advertiser).
The two scenarios with advertiser singlehoming are more complex because competition for
the advertiser reduces the surplus that platforms can share with consumers (due to low adver-
tising fees). Since consumer prices are set after the fees charged to the advertiser, opportunistic
platform behaviour leads to consumer prices that are too high from the perspective of the ver-
tical structure (platform and advertiser). For these two scenarios, we show that, despite this
double marginalization, the total prot that can be promised by each platform to the adver-
tiser remains increasing in the total surplus per consumer. Thus, in equilibrium, competition
for the advertiser still leads the platform winning the advertiser to maximize the total surplus
per consumer. Indeed, the platform generating the highest total surplus is able to o¤er better
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terms to the advertiser along with higher fees. Higher advertising fees act as a commitment
device inducing the platform to reduce the price charged to consumers, which is benecial for
the vertical structure. This logic applies both when consumers multihome and when they
singlehome.
For the second part of the proposition, the result and interpretation is the same as in the
monopoly case above. If platforms charge positive access fees to consumers, they must o¤er
them more value, i.e. less diversion. Conversely, if platforms subsidize the participation of
consumers, they need to make up for the loss by increasing advertising revenues, which they
can achieve by increasing diversion.
5 Conclusion
Our study of search diversion by competing platforms has yielded several important and novel
insights (relative to Hagiu and Jullien 2011). First and most importantly, the e¤ect of com-
petition between platforms on the equilibrium level of search diversion is determined by the
nature of competition. When horizontal di¤erentiation between competing platforms in the
eyes of consumers is reduced, the equilibrium level of search diversion decreases (i.e. search
quality increases), as expected. On the other hand, we have shown that entry of a competitor
may lead to more or at least as much search diversion as under monopoly. Specically, when
consumers singlehome, entry of a competitor leads to more (less) search diversion relative to
monopoly when the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation is intermediate (low). When the degree
of horizontal di¤erentiation is large, "competing" platforms behave as local monopolies and
therefore divert search to the exact same extent as a monopolist would. An important result is
that e¤ective competition for exclusive a¢ liation on both sides of the market sometimes leads
to a level of search diversion that maximizes total industry prot.
Second, allowing platforms to charge unrestricted access fees to consumers leads to the
striking result that competing platforms choose the exact same level of search diversion as a
monopoly platform, irrespective of the nature of competition and of the degree of horizontal
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di¤erentiation. Furthermore, under monopoly and competition with at least one multihoming
side, platforms that charge positive access fees to consumers have weaker incentives to divert
search relative to platforms that cannot (or choose not to) charge such fees. On the other hand,
platforms that subsidize consumer participation have stronger incentives to divert search.
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6 Appendix
In order to reduce clutter, throughout the appendix we will drop the (;t) arguments of the various
levels of s, unless they are needed for clarity.
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6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
If t 2 [V (sX) ; V (sXV )] then sM (; t) = V  1 (t), decreasing in t and constant in .
If t  V (sX) then sM (; t) = argmaxs fX (s; )g, so the F.O.C. determining sM can be
written:
F

u
1 + s

 

1

+ s

u
(1 + s)2
F 0

u
1 + s

= 0
The left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming second-order conditions are satised)
that sM (; t) is increasing in . It is obviously constant in t.
If t  V (sXV ) then sM (; t) = argmaxs fX (s; )V (s)g, so the F.O.C. determining sM is:
1

+ s


  u
(1 + s)2
F 0

u
1 + s

V (s) + F

u
1 + s

V 0 (s)

+ F

u
1 + s

V (s) = 0
Since V 0 (s) < 0, the left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming second-order conditions
are satised) that sM (; t) is increasing in  and constant in t.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Given sj , platform is prots are:
i (si) =
8<: X (si; )
h
1
2
+
V (si) V (sj)
2t
i
if V (si) + V (sj)  t
X (si; )
V (si)
t
if V (si) + V (sj)  t
There are therefore 3 possible equilibria:
1) sc = sXV 2, where sXV 2 solves equation (6), so that sXV 2 is determined by the following F.O.C.:
X (s; )V 0 (s) + tXs (s; ) = 0 (11)
From this, it is easily seen that sXV 2 is increasing in t. It is also increasing in  by a very simi-
lar argument to that employed in the proof of proposition 1. This is an equilibrium if and only if
V (sXV 2)  t=2 (the consumer in the middle of the Hotelling segment obtains non-negative utility),
i.e. only if t  t1, where t1 is uniquely dened by:
V
 
sXV 2
 
; t1

= t1=2
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Furthermore, comparing (11) with (3) we have:
sXV 2 (; V (sXV )) = sXV , (12)
so that V (sXV 2 (; V (sXV ))) > V (sXV ) =2, which implies t1 > V (sXV ).
2) sc = sXV . This is an equilibrium if and only if V (sXV )  t=2, i.e. if and only if t  2V (sXV ).
Let us show that 2V (sXV ) > t1. The rst-order conditions that determine sXV 2
 
; t1

and sXV ()
are, respectively:
X (s; )V 0 (s) + 2V (s)Xs (s; ) = 0 for sXV 2
 
; t1

X (s; )V 0 (s) + V (s)Xs (s; ) = 0 for sXV ()
Comparing the two, it is clear that sXV 2
 
; t1

> sXV (), which implies:
t1 = 2V
 
sXV 2
 
; t1

< 2V (sXV )
3) sc = V
 1 (t=2). Suppose s2 = V  1 (t=2). If s1  V  1 (t=2) then platform 1s prots are
X (s1; )V (s1) =t. Thus, for s1 = V  1 (t=2) to be a best response to s2 = V  1 (t=2), it must be
that sXV  V  1 (t=2), i.e. if t  2V (sXV ).
If s1  V  1 (t=2) then platform 1s prots are:
X (s1; )

1
2
+
V (s1)  t=2
2t

The maximizer s of this prot expression is dened by the rst-order condition:
X (s; )V 0 (s) + (t=2 + V (s))Xs (s; ) = 0
Thus, for s1 = V  1 (t=2) to be a best response to s2 = V  1 (t=2), it must be that s  V  1 (t=2),
i.e. V (s)  t=2, which implies:
X (s; )V 0 (s) + 2V (s)Xs (s; )  0
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Comparing this with the rst-order condition determining sXV 2
 
; t1

,
X (s; )V 0 (s) + 2V (s)Xs (s; ) = 0,
we have s  sXV 2
 
; t1

, which is equivalent to V (s)  V  sXV 2  ; t1 = t1=2. Consequently,
we must have t  t1.
Thus, sc = V
 1 (t=2) is an equilibrium if and only if t 2 t1; 2V (sXV ). Note that V  1 (t=2) is
decreasing in t.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
On the interval t 2 0; t1, we know from proposition 1 and lemma 1 that sM is decreasing in t,
whereas sc = sXV 2 is increasing in t. Furthermore, from (12), we have sXV 2 = sXV = s
M at
t = V (sXV ). We can conclude that sc < s
M for t < V (sXV ) and sc > s
M for V (sXV ) < t < t1.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider stage 3. The advertisers payo¤ from a¢ liating exclusively with platform i is:
(   ri) siF

u
1 + si

min

V (si)
t
; 1

= (X (si; ) X (si; ri))min

V (si)
t
; 1

,
while platform is payo¤ is X (si; ri)min (V (si) =t; 1). In stage 2, platform i is prepared to lower
its fee ri until its payo¤ is equal to its outside option, F (u)min (V (0) =t; 1). Consequently, in the
equilibrium of the game starting at stage 2, the advertiser a¢ liates with the platform that has the
highest X (si; ri)min (V (si) =t; 1). The fees in the stage 2 equilibrium are determined by:
(X (si; ) X (si; ri))min

V (si)
t
; 1

= X (sj; )min

V (sj)
t
; 1

  F (u)min

V (0)
t
; 1

for the "winning" platform i and:
X (sj; rj)min

V (sj)
t
; 1

= F (u)

V (0)
t
; 1

for the "losing" platform j.
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Consider now stage 1. If X (si; )min (V (si) =t; 1) > X (sj; )min (V (sj) =t; 1) then platform
i attracts the advertiser with probability 1 and obtains prots
F (u)min

V (0)
t
; 1

+X (si; )min

V (si)
t
; 1

 X (sj; )min

V (sj)
t
; 1

.
This is an equilibrium if and only if si = argmaxs fX (s; )min (V (s) =t; 1)g. IfX (si; )min (V (si) =t; 1) =
X (sj; )min (V (sj) =t; 1) then the advertiser is indi¤erent between a¢ liating with either platform
and both platformsprots are equal to F (u)min (V (0) =t; 1). This is an equilibrium if and only if
si = sj = argmaxs fX (s; )min (V (s) =t; 1)g. Thus, we have proven that the equilibrium level of
search diversion in all cases is argmaxs fX (s; )min (V (s) =t; 1)g = sM (; t).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Denote by
 bPM ; bsM the solutions to the optimization program:
max
P;s

(P +X (s; ))min

V (s)  P
t
; 1

There are only two possibilities:
 if V  bsM  bPM  t then it must be that bPM = V  bsM  t and prots are equal to V  bsM+
X
 bsM ;   t, which means we must have bsM = sX+V
 if V  bsM   bPM < t then it must be that bPM =  V  bsM X  bsM ;  =2 and prots are
equal to
 
V
 bsM+X  bsM ; 2 =4t, so that we must have bsM = sX+V
Thus, bsM = sX+V in all cases. The rst-order condition determining sX+V can then be written:
 u
(1 + s)2
F 0

u
1 + s

+ F

u
1 + s

+ V 0 (s) = = 0
The left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming the second-order condition is satised)
that sX+V is increasing in .
The optimal access fee is:
bPM =
8<: V (sX+V )  t if t  (V (sX+V ) +X (sX+V ; )) =2(V (sX+V ) X (sX+V ; )) =2 if t  (V (sX+V ) +X (sX+V ; )) =2
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Now compare sX+V and sXV by looking at the rst-order conditions that determine them:
Xs (sX+V ; ) + V
0 (sX+V ) = 0
Xs (sXV ; )V (sXV ) +X (sXV ; )V
0 (sXV ) = 0
It is thus apparent that max fsX+V ; sXV g  sX and sX+V  sXV if and only if V (sX+V ) 
X (sX+V ; ). Consider then the two possible cases:
 If V (sX+V )  X (sX+V ; ) then bPM  0 for all t and sX+V  sXV . Recalling the expression
of sM (t; ) from 4, this implies that bsM ()  sM (t; ) for all t
 If V (sX+V ) < X (sX+V ; ) then bPM  0 if and only if t  V (sX+V ). But in this case
we also have sX > sX+V > sXV , i.e. V (sX) < V (sX+V ) < V (sXV ), which implies that
sM (V (sX+V ) ; ) = sX+V = bsM (). Since sM (t; ) is decreasing in t, we therefore conclude
that bsM ()  sM (t; ) if and only if t  V (sX+V ).
Thus, we have shown that in all cases, bsM  sM if and only if bPM  0.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 6
6.6.1 Consumers singlehome and the advertiser multihomes
The determination of the equilibrium level of search diversion bsc () is in the main text. For the
second part of the proposition, the equilibrium access fee charged by the two platforms is PCc =
t X (bsc () ; ). The two rst order conditions that determine bsc () and sc () = sXV 2 (focusing
on the case in which platforms actually compete) are, respectively:
X 0 (bsc ; ) + V 0 (bsc) = 0
X 0 (sc ; ) +X (s

c ; )
V 0 (sc)
t
= 0
Comparing, it is easily seen that bsc  sc if and only if t  X (bsc () ; ), i.e. if and only if PCc  0.
6.6.2 Consumers multihome and the advertiser singlehomes
Suppose that in stage 3 the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i 2 fA;Bg. Then, in stage 4, platform
is prots are (Pi +X (si; ri))min f(V (si)  Pi) =t; 1g, which it optimizes over Pi to obtain prots
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equal to P (Vi (si) +X (si; ri)), where:
P (z) 
8<: z
2
4t
if z  2t
z   t if z  2t
Clearly, P (:) is increasing. In turn, platform js stage 4 prots are P (V (0) + F (u))  0.
The advertisers payo¤ from a¢ liation with platform i is then:
iadv = (   ri) siF

u
1 + si

min

V (si) +X (si; ri)
2t
; 1

In Stage 2, platforms choose (rA; rB) taking (sA; sB) as given, which is equivalent to choosing
(ZA; ZB), where:
ZA  V (sA) +X (sA; rA) and ZB V (sB) +X (sB; rB)
Indeed, recall that X (si; ri) is increasing in ri so there is a one-to-one relationship between ri and Zi
for each i 2 fA;Bg.
To simplify notation, we also denote:
Wi  V (si) +X (si; ) and Vi V (si) for i 2fA;Bg
which are xed from the perspective of stage 2.
The advertisers payo¤ from a¢ liation with platform i is then:
(Wi   Zi)min

Zi
2t
; 1

 adv (Zi;Wi)
It is easily seen that adv (Zi;Wi) is single-peaked in Zi and increasing in Wi. Let also:
bZ (W )  argmax
Z
fadv (Z;W )g =
8<: W2 if W4t  12t if W
4t
 1
(13)
We rst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 In the stage 2 equilibrium, if the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i then Wi  Wj.
Proof. If the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i in stage 3, then in the stage 2 equilibrium (choices
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of Zi and Zj) we must have:
i = max
Zi
fP (Zi)g such that adv (Zi;Wi)  jadv (14)
jadv = max
Zj
fadv (Zj;Wj)g s.t. P (Wj)  0 (15)
Denote by
 
Zi ; Z

j

the resulting equilibrium choices.
Since P (Zi) is increasing in Zi, whereas adv (Zi;Wi) is single-peaked in Zi and zero for Zi =
Wi, in equilibrium the constraint in the program (14) must be binding with the highest possible value
of Zi, so that
adv (Z

i ;Wi) = 
j
adv
There are two possibilities. First, if the constraint in program (15) is not binding in equilibrium then:
jadv = max
Zj
fadv (Zj;Wj)g = max
Zj

(Wj   Yj)min

Zj
2t
; 1

Combined with (14), this implies:
max
Zi

(Wi   Zi)min

Zi
2t
; 1

 (Wi   Zi )min

Zi
2t
; 1

= max
Zj

(Wj   Zj)min

Zj
2t
; 1

,
It is easily veried that this implies Wi  Wj .
Second, suppose instead the constraint in (15) is binding in equilibrium:
P
 
Zj

= 0  P (Zi ) ,
where the last inequality is required in equilibrium (otherwise platform i would prefer to not attract
the advertiser). Since P (:) is increasing, this is equivalent to:
Zj = V (0) + F (u)  Zi (16)
Furthermore, if the constraint in (15) binds then Zj = bZ (Wj) violates the constraint, i.e.
bZ (Wj) < V (0) + F (u) (17)
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Once again, there are two possibilities:
 If bZ (Wi)  V (0) + F (u) then bZ (Wi) > bZ (Wj) (18)
From (13), this is only possible if Wi > Wj (and Wj < 4t):
 If bZ (Wi) < V (0) + F (u) then (16) and (14) imply
adv (Z

i ;Wi)  adv (V (0) + F (u) ;Wi)
adv (Z

i ;Wi) = adv
 
Zj ;Wj

= adv (F (u) + V (0) ;Wj) ,
which implies
adv (V (0) + F (u) ;Wi)  adv (F (u) + V (0) ;Wj) ,
i.e. Wi  Wj .
Suppose that in equilibrium platform A wins the advertiser. Then WA  WB and platform As
prots can we rewritten:
A = w (sA; sB)  max
ZA
fP (ZA)g (19)
s.t. (WA   ZA)min

ZA
2t
; 1

 adv (sB)
where:
adv (sB)  max
ZB

(WB   ZB)ZB
2t

s.t. P (ZB)  0 (20)
Suppose there exists s0A such that W
0
A = X (s
0
A; )+V (s
0
A) > WA = X (sA; )+V (sA), which
impliesW 0A > WB. Thus, if platform A deviates to s
0
A in stage 1 then it wins the advertiser in stage 2
with probability 1. Furthermore, since adv (sB) remains unchanged, the optimization problem above
immediately implies w (s0A; sB) > w (sA; sB). Therefore s
0
A is a protable deviation. Thus, it must
be that in the stage 1 equilibrium sA = sX+V  argmaxs fX (s; ) + V (s)g.
If sB 6= sX+V then platform B makes prots 0 with probability 1 and 0 does not depend on
sB. If sB = sA = sX+V then we may assume that A wins the advertiser with probability 1. Thus, in
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all cases it is an equilibrium that platform A chooses sA = sX+V and wins the advertiser.
For the second part of the proposition corresponding to this scenario, simply note that bsa = bsM
(which we have just proven) and sa = s
M (from proposition 3). And we have already proven that
bsM  sM if and only if PM  0 (proposition 5). We can therefore directly conclude that bsa  sa if
and only if P a  0 (since P a = PM ).
6.6.3 Both sides singlehome
Suppose that in stage 3 the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i 2 fA;Bg. Then, in stage 4, platform
i and platform js prots are, respectively:
(Pi +X (si; ri))
1
2t
(t+ V (si)  V (0)  Pi + Pj)
(Pj + F (u))
1
2t
(t+ V (0)  V (si)  Pj + Pi)
Calculating the Nash equilibrium in prices, we obtain that stage 4 equilibrium prots are, respectively:
i =
1
2t

t+
V (si) +X (si; ri)  V (0)  F (u)
3
2
j =
1
2t

t+
V (0) + F (u)  V (si) X (si; ri)
3
2
The advertisers payo¤ from a¢ liation with platform i is then:
iadv = (X (si; ) X (si; ri))
1
2t

t+
V (si) +X (si; ri)  V (0)  F (u)
3

In Stage 2, platforms choose (rA; rB) taking (sA; sB) as given, which is equivalent to choosing
(ZA; ZB), where:
Zi  X (si; ri) + V (si)
Indeed, recall that X (si; ri) is increasing in ri so there is a one-to-one relationship between ri and Zi
for each i 2 fA;Bg.
Denote also:
Wi  X (si; ) + V (si) for i 2 f1; 2g
W0  V (0) + F (u)
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which are xed from the perspective of stage 2.
Suppose that platform i wins the advertiser. Then platform prots in stage 4 can be written:
i = w (Zi)  1
2t

t+
Zi  W0
3
2
j = l (Zi)  1
2t

t+
W0   Zi
3
2
Meanwhile, the advertisers payo¤ from a¢ liation with platform i is:
adv (Zi;Wi)  (Wi   Zi) 1
2t

t+
Zi  W0
3

First, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3 In the stage 3 equilibrium, if the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i then Wi  Wj.
Proof. Suppose platform i wins the advertiser in the equilibrium of the stage 2 game and denote by 
Zi ; Z

j

the equilibrium choices in stage 2. We must then have:
Zi = argmax
Zi
fw (Zi)g s.t. adv (Zi;Wi)  badv (Wj;l (Zi )) (21)badv (Wj;l (Zi ))  max
Zj
fadv (Zj;Wj)g s.t. w (Zj)  l (Zi ) (22)
Since w (Zi) is increasing in Zi, whereas adv (Zi;Wi) is concave in Zi and equals 0 at Zi = Wi,
in equilibrium the constraint in (21) must be binding and adv (Zi;Wi) must be decreasing in Zi at
the point Zi = Zi where it intersects badv (Wj;l (Zi )). This is equivalent to:
Wi   3t+W0  2Zi (23)
Suppose the constraint in (22) is not binding. Then in equilibrium:
Zj =
Wj   3t+W0
2badv (Wj;l (Zi )) = 124t (3t+Wj  W0)2
so that:
1
24t
(3t+Wi  W0)2  (Wi   Z

i )
2t

t+
Zi  W0
3

=
1
24t
(3t+Wj  W0)2 ,
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which directly implies Wi  Wj .
Suppose now the constraint in (22) is binding, which means:
Zj  W0 = W0   Zi (24)
Furthermore, this requires that the peak of adv (Zj;Wj) in Zj violates the constraint, i.e.:
Wj   3t+W0
2
 W0 < W0   Zi
which can be rewritten:
Wj < 3t+ 3W0   2Zi (25)
Taking the sum of inequalities (23) and (25) above, we obtain:
Wi +Wj < 6t+ 2W0 (26)
We can then write the fact that the constraint in (21) is binding, adv (Zi ;Wi) = badv (Wj;l (Zi )),
as:
(Wi   Zi )
2t

t+
Zi  W0
3

=
 
Wj   Zj

2t

t+
Zj  W0
3

,
which, after using (24) and re-arranging, is equivalent to:
t
 
Wi  Wj   Zi + Zj

+
Zi  W0
3
 
Wi +Wj   Zi   Zj

= 0
Using (24) again, this is equivalent to:
t (Wi  Wj) + Z

i  W0
3
(Wi +Wj   2W0   6t) = 0
But (26) implies Wi +Wj   2W0   6t < 0 and we must have Zi  W0  0 (otherwise platform i
would prefer to not provide any advertising in stage 4). Thus, we conclude that Wi  Wj  0.
Suppose platform A wins the advertiser in equilibrium. Then the lemma implies X (sA; ) +
V (sA)  X (sB; ) + V (sB) and platform As prot in stage 2 is A (sA; sB) = w (ZA), where
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ZA solves:
ZA = argmax
ZA
(
1
2t

t+
ZA  W0
3
2)
s.t.
(WA   ZA)
2t

t+
ZA  W0
3

 badv (WB; ZA)
badv (WB; ZA)  max
ZB

(WB   ZB)
2t

t+
ZB  W0
3

s.t.
1
2t

t+
ZB  W0
3
2
 1
2t

t+
W0   ZA
3
2
Suppose there exists s0A such that X (s
0
A; ) + V (s
0
A) > X (sA; ) + V (sA), which implies
X (s0A; ) + V (s
0
A) > X (sB; ) + V (sB). Thus, if platform A deviates to s
0
A in stage 1 then
the lemma above implies that platform A wins the advertiser in stage 2 with probability 1. Let
then A (s0A; sB) = w (Z
0
A ), where Z
0
A is dened similarly to Z

A, except that WA is replaced by
W 0A  X (s0A; ) + V (s0A).
There are several possibilities. First suppose the constraint in the denition of badv (WB; ZA) is
not binding, i.e. badv (WB; ZA) = 124t (3t+WB  W0)2 ,
which does not depend on ZA. Pick then any " such that 0 < " < W
0
A   WA. We have Z0A 
ZA + " > Z

A. To see this, note that
1
2t
 
t+ ZA W0
3
2
is increasing in ZA and:
(W 0A   ZA   ")
2t

t+
ZA + " W0
3

>
(WA   ZA)
2t

t+
ZA  W0
3

= badv (WB; ZA) = badv (WB; ZA + ")
where the last equality follows from the fact that 1
2t

t+
W0 ZA
3
2
is decreasing in ZA.
Second, suppose the constraint in the denition of bA (WB; ZA) is binding, which implies
ZB  W0 = W0   ZA
and
ZA = argmax
ZA
(
1
2t

t+
ZA  W0
3
2)
(27)
s.t.
(WA   ZA)
2t

t+
ZA  W0
3

 (WB   2W0 + Z

A)
2t

t+
W0   ZA
3

There are now two possibilities regarding Z0A :
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 If the constraint in the denition of badv (WB; Z0A ) is also binding then we have:
Z0A = argmax
ZA
(
1
2t

t+
ZA  W0
3
2)
(28)
s.t.
(W 0A   ZA)
2t

t+
ZA  W0
3

 (WB   2W0 + Z
0
A )
2t

t+
W0   Z0A
3

Comparing (27) and (28), the only di¤erence is W 0A > WA, so Z
0
A > Z

A.
 If the constraint in the denition of badv (WB; Z0A ) is not binding then:
WB   3t+W0
2
 W0  W0   Z0A
and, since the constraint in the denition of badv (WB; ZA) is binding, we also have:
WB   3t+W0
2
 W0 < W0   ZA
The last two inequalities imply Z0A > Z

A.
Thus, in all possible cases, we have Z0A > Z

A, which means that s
0
A is a protable deviation
for platform A: A (s0A; sB) > A (s
0
A; sB). Therefore, it must be that in the stage 1 equilibrium
sA = sX+V  argmaxs fX (s; ) + V (s)g.
If sB 6= sX+V then platform B makes prots 12t

t+
W0 ZA
3
2
with probability 1.
If s2B = sA = sX+V then:
 with probability 1/2 platform 1 wins the advertiser so platform Bs prots are still 0
 with probability 1/2 platform B wins the advertiser so its prots are w (sX+V ; sX+V )  0
(the inequality is strict if the constraint in program 20 is not binding).
Thus, in all cases it is an equilibrium for platform B to also choose sB = sX+V (this is the only
equilibrium if the constraint in program 20 is not binding).
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